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Olsen: Power of a Corporate to Repurchase its Stock
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
POWER OF A CORPORATION TO REPURCHASE
ITS STOCK
There is reason to believe that the Montana cases,1 in adopting the common law limitations on the power of a corporation to
purchase its own stock, ignore the implications of the relevant
statute. The common law rule, in the form approved by the
cases, is "that a private corporation may purchase its own
stock if the transaction is fair and in good faith; if the corporation is not insolvent, or in the process of dissolution; and
if the rights of its creditors are in no way affected thereby."'
The provision of the statute,' however, is that "the directors of corporations must not make dividends, except from the
surplus profits arising from the business thereof; nor must
they divide, withdraw, or pay to the stockholders, or any of
them, any part of the capital stock; nor must they reduce or
increase the capital stock, except as hereinafter specially provided . . ."
It is apparent that the term "capital stock" is used in this
statute with two different meanings;' it is first used as meaning
a fund of assets equivalent to the total "liability" on all outstanding' stock (i.e., par value or, if no par, valuation entered
in the Capital Stock Account), but in its second use the meaning is that the total stock liability cannot be decreased nor the
authorized capitalization increased. But do the cases adopt
these meanings?
Some Courts have construed such statutes strictly. Thus,
the California Court, interpreting a statute' identical with that
'Porter v. Plymouth Gold Min. Co., 29 Mont. 347, 74 Pac. 938, 101 Am.
St. Rep. 569 (1904) ; Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., 86 Mont.
500, 284 Pac. 267 (1930).
'FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Secs. 1136,
1141, so states the common law rule, adding however, "if without
prejudice to the rights of other stockholders." BALLANTINE ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Sec. 66, says that by the "general" rule a corporation can purchase its own stock provided only that it have a "surplus." He cites both statutory and non-statutory cases. Cf. STEVENS
ON CORPORATIONS, Sec. 60, p. 247.
He limits a similar rule strictly to
power of corporation under repurchase subscription contracts-quite
a different question. Cf. GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACCOUNTING IN LAW
PRACTICE, Sec. 88. Does Ballantine assume that the word "Insolvent"
In the general rule is defined so as to require a surplus? That capital stock sometimes is described as a liability, though not generally
considered a correct accounting practice, see Weiner, THEORY OF ANGLOAMERICAN DIVIDEND LAW, 29, 461, 465 (1929); Cannon v. Wiscassett
Mills Co., 195 N. C. 119, 141 S. E. 344 (1928) Borg v. International
Silver Co., 11 F. (2d) 147, 150 (C. C. A., 2d, 1925).
'R.
C. M., 1935, Sec. 5939.
4
See GRAHAM AND KATZ, uupre, note 2, See. 83; BAILANTINE, eUpra,
note 2, Sees. 128-129.
'This must be understood as including treasury stock although, strictly speaking, there is no "liability" on such stock.
"Cx. CIV CODE, 1929, Sec. 309 (en. 1872).
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of Montana, declared the expression "capital stock" to mean
"not the shares of which the nominal capital is composed, but
the actual capital--. e. assets-with which the corporation carries on its corporate business."' Since, of course, all assets are
used to carry on the business, this limitation might mean almost anything. In fact, later California cases have construed
"capital stock" to mean all of the assets of the corporation,
thus absolutely prohibiting general purchases by a corporation
of its own stock.'
The Utah Supreme Court achieved a similar result in con3truing a statute' like that of Montana except for the use of
the word "capital" instead of "capital stock". It held that
"capital"

meant "assets"."

The Utah Court said in effect

that, while the statute might be construed to allow buying of
a corporation's own stock out of the "earned surplus", since
the corporation can so easily "pad" its surplus account and
thus avoid the spirit of the statute, the corporation will not be
allowed to buy back its stock under any circumstances.'
Other jurisdictions likewise construe this or a similar
statute either so as absolutely to prohibit a corporation from
buying its own stock or at least to limit greatly that power."
On the other hand, the extreme view that there is no impairment of capital so long as the repurchased stock remains
in the treasury has been expressed by the Colorado Court."
'Shulte v. Boulevard Gardens Land Co., 164 Cal. 464, 129 Pac. 582,
583, 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 156 (1913). The Court found a surplus and
enforced the stock sale and repurchase contract. However, it is submitted that had this not been a sale and repurchase contract, exception would not have been made even though a surplus were found.
'Hansen v. California Bank, 17 Cal. App 2d 80, 61 P. (2d) 794, 801
(1936) ; Stevens v. Boyes Hot Springs Co. 113 Cal. App. 479, 298 Pac.
508, 510 (1931).
'R. S., Utah, 1933, Sec. 103-12-4, sub. 2.
"oPace v. Pace Bros. Co., 91 Utah 132, 59 P. (2d)1, esp. on rehearing,
91 Utah 149, 63 P. (2d) 590 (1936).
"The reasoning, that a contrary rule necessarily would permit creation
of an artificial surplus through markup of assets in boom years, is
clearly unsound, as shown by the cases disallowing such practices for
dividend purposes. Kingston v. Home Life Ins. Co. 11 Del. Ch. 258,
101 Ati. 898 (1917) ; Southern California Home Builders v. Young,
45 Cal.' App. 679, 188 Pac. 586 (1920).
'In
Kom v. Cody Detective Agency, Inc., 76 Wash. 540, 136 P. 1155
(1913), the Washington Court's interpretation of the statute (REM.
AND BAL. WASH. STAT., Sec. 3697; see also, REM. REy. STAT. OF WASH.,
1932, See. 3823) absolutely prohibits the repurchase by a corporation
of its own stock. Maryland reads this prohibition Into the statutory
provisions for reduction of stated capital. Maryland Trust Co. v. National Mechanic's Bank, 102 Md. 608, 63 Atl. 70 (1906).
See In re
International Radiator Co., 10 Del. Ch. 358, 92 At. 255, 256 (1914), "a
corporation may use only its surplus for the purchase of shares of Its
own capital stock . . . ;" followed in Ashman v. Miller, 101 F. (2d)

85, 90 (1939).
"Colorado Industrial Loan and Investment Co. v. Clem, 82 Colo. 399,
260 Pac. 1019, 1022 (1927).
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The statute,1' although expressly authorizing a corporation to
purchase its own stock, forbade use of funds for this purpose
"when such use will cause an impairment of capital."
The
Court stated that "if the directors merged or extinguished or
cancelled the stock after its purchase" impairment of the
capital of the corporation "might be the result . . . but there

is no evidence at all here that anything of that sort occurred,
and the record justifies the assertion that the Company holds
this stock in its treasury and may, at any time it sees fit and
could do so, sell the same .

.

. It is presumed to be held as an

asset of the corporation for sale.""
Prof. Ballantine has condemned the "unfortunate practice" approved by the Colorado case, commenting that "no
asset is received to take the place of what is paid out, any more
than in the case of a dividend. Earned surplus may not be reimbursed by carrying treasury shares as an asset.""
The latter view was adopted by the Delaware Court under
a similar statute." The Court said that capital impairment as
here used "means the reduction of the amount of the assets of
the company below the amount represented by the aggregate
outstanding shares of the capital stock of the company ...
The statute must mean, therefore, that the funds and property
of the company shall not be used for the purchase of shares of
its own capital stock when the value of its assets is less than
the aggregate amount of all the shares of its capital stock."'"
There are only two Montana cases" on this problem." In
"CoLD LAWS, 1921, Sec. 2260.

'Such views may be partly explained by the fact that courts are misled by accounting practices. The purchase by a corporation of its
own shares is sometimes recorded as an asset. Judge Learned Hand's
opinion
cited as
that as
so long

In Borg v. International Silver Co., 8upra, note 2, may be
not disapproving this practice; but what he really meant was
an accounting device it makes little difference how recorded
as the proper corresponding entries are made on each side of
the ledger. See GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACCOUNTiNG IN LAW PRACTICE,
Section 89, esp. p. 165, stating that "it is considered better practice to
omit treasury stock from the asset side." Regardless of how the treasury shares are shown on the balance sheet the "stated surplus" will
be misleading unless their share value is expressly charged against
the surplus. GRAHAM AND KATZ, IOC. Cit.
"A Critical Survey of the Illinois' Busine8s Corporation Act, 1 U. OF
CH. L. REV. 357, 366 (1934). See In accord, GRAHAM AND KATZ, AcCOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE, Section 89; MORAWETZ ON PRIVATE COaPORATIONS, Section 112.
"Section 19 of the General Corporation Act of Delaware (REV. CODE,
1938, Sec. 2051).
"In re International Radiator Co., supra, note 12; Ashman v. Miller,
8upra, note 12.
"Cited supra, note 1. Barth v. Pock, 51 Mont. 418, 155 Pac. 282, 285
(1915), though discussing the general doctrine of the Porter case involved only a gift to a banking corporation of Its own stock, hence is
not considered.
"This paper makes no attempt to evaluate directly these two Montana
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the first case,' where the corporation had sold the stock and
agreed to repurchase it, the Court, while denying relief because
the plaintiff had failed to tender the stock, went on to uphold
the latter agreement with no reference to the statute" except
the final clause quoted therefrom, which prohibits reduction of
capital stock except as otherwise provided by statute. It was
said that the corporation was not shown to be insolvent, but no
definition of insolvency was given. The Court held that there
was no unlawful reduction of capital stock, saying: "The mere
repurchase of this stock would not tend to decrease the capital
stock of the company . . .

The company could own and deal

with it just the same as it had done before the sale... When it
is transferred to the company, it becomes a part of its property.
It is there for the creditors and stockholders. The capital stock
is not decreased. A portion of the capital of the company may
be unavailable until the stock is again sold and issued, but
nothing is destroyed ..

.

The above language suggests that the Montana Court, like
that of Colorado, failed to realize that the share certificates,
while in the corporate treasury, are not and do not represent
property. It cannot be denied that a purchase by a corporation
of shares of itself is a reduction of assets.' As the Utah Court
said, in considering the Montana view, "it would give little
comfort to a creditor if he found all the assets gone but the
treasury full of the corporation's own stock certificates, paid
for by its assets."
The issue was more squarely presented in a later case'
which also involved a sale and repurchase contract. After reciting the common law limitation, the Montana Court interpreted insolvency as an "insufficiency of assets to pay its debts
in full" (i. e., debts as distinguished from obligations to stockholders). The Court recognized that the corporation was insolvent but said "there is no showing in the complaints that
there are any creditors of the defendant corporation, nor that
cases as precedent on the general power of a Montana corporation to
repurchase its own stock. Though they have been cited and severely
criticized in other jurisdictions as stating the Montana rule, they may
be distinguished and limited on several grounds. The failure of these
cases fully to consider R. C. M., Sec. 5939, and the assumption that
the question is governed solely by the common law rule in Montana,
is the concern of this comment.
"Porter v. Plymouth Gold Min. Co., 8upra, note 1.
"Supra, note 3.
'See GRAHAM AND KATZ, ACcOUNTING IN LAW PRACTICE, Section 89;
MORAW.'rZ ON PRIVATE CORPORATIONS, Section 112. Of course it is true
that a mere repurchase does not amount to a technical cancellation of
stock, so as to require a reduction in the capital stock account. In
fact, capital stock reduction in this manner is uniformly prohibited.
Of. GRAHAM AND KATZ, supra, Section 83.
'Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., supra, note 10.
"Davies v. Montana Auto Finance Corp., supra, note 1.
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the enforcement of plaintiff's demands will work any injury to
any stockholder."
The Court enforced the agreement. The
statute was not mentioned.
This examination of cases reveals that, in applying statutes
like this, a large majority of Courts have, on one ground or
another, prohibited corporations from purchasing their own
stock or have limited such purchases to surplus." Since the
only two Montana cases raising the question at all did not involve the general power to purchase, and since the Court considered the pertinent sections of the statute not at all, it is
submitted that the Montana Court is free to announce whatever
rule a thorough examination of the question justifies. In stating that rule, however, the Court should bear in mind two
points: (1) The minimum requirement of the statute standing
alone is that the corporation in any event have assets in excess
of the capital stock account valuation of the outstanding shares
and that it be limited in its purchases to that excess of assets;
(2 The common law rule regulating such purchases has not
been repealed by the Montana statute, but rather supplements
it. It would be well, also, to hearken to the words of a leading
authority," that the governing rule should be particularized to
fit each type of stock transaction. California has so formulated
its law by statute." Perhaps that is the most satisfactory way
of handling the question.
Arnold H. Olsen.
"Supra, notes 2 and 12.

Cf. Pace v. Pace Bros. Co., supra, note 10;

GRAHAM AND KATZ, OP. Cit., Sec. 88.

The last-cited writers say, "The

result of this view [the trust fund doctrine] is that the purchase of a
corporation's own stock may be made only "out of surplus," i.e., only
if the net assets after the purchase are at least equal to the amount
of the stated capital." This is supposed to be a statement of the
prevailing rule "apart from statute." But is "surplus" used in the
accounting sense here? In any case the meaning of the statement is
problematical. Though probably more satisfactory than any other
inclusive rule, it is difficult to support the position either that such
statute or the so-called trust fund doctrine alone compels the rule that
the corporation must have a surplus in the strict accounting sense before it buys its own stock. Suppose a corporation has $f0,000 capital
stock outstanding, $15,000 assets, and $25,000 debts. The statute of
itself protects only a fund equivalent to $10,000. Thus the corporation
would be allowed to purchase $5,000 worth of its own stock, though
there clearly is no surplus. But the common law plus the statute may
impose much more extensive limitations.
"STEVE S,Op cit., p. 240.
2CAz.. Cxv. CODa, 1933, Sees. 342, 342-a.
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